

# 50 Cities Selected By Joint Chiefs for Antimissile System

By RICHARD FRYKLUND  
Star Staff Writer

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have drawn up a list of 50 cities which would get special protection under an antimissile system they want to install.

The list of cities never has been made public, but when Congress, governors and mayors do find out which are the presumably lucky — and unlucky cities — the political uproar could be great.

Most of the biggest cities—Washington, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit and Baltimore for instance—are on the list, it can be said authoritatively. But some of the country's 50 biggest cities, such as Omaha, Neb., are left off.

There are more than 100 cities with a population greater than 100,000 which do not appear on the Joint Chief's list, including such state capitals as Richmond, Va.; Lansing, Mich.; Phoenix, Ariz., and Sacramento, Calif.

## McNamara Opposes Plan

A majority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and perhaps all of them—plan to support the 50-city proposal before Congress this year, despite opposition to their proposal from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

The chiefs have recommended that Congress appropriate funds for a Nike-X anti-missile missile that would defend American bases for long-range missiles and bombers while also providing some protection to the public.

The chiefs recommend that a "thin" defense of long-range "Spartan" missiles be installed to cover the entire continental United States and that 50 cities be given the extra protection of short-range "Sprint" missiles.

The Spartan would intercept some enemy missiles in

space several hundred miles from their targets. The Sprint would try to catch those that get past the Spartan as they descended on cities or military bases.

Because of the high cost, the chiefs say, the double protection cannot be given to all cities.

They recommend that they be permitted to start with the thin general defense plus a heavier defense for 25 cities. This, they say, will cost \$9.9 billion. McNamara believes would really cost another \$15 billion.

The second step recommended by the chiefs would add the thick protection to 25 or more cities for another \$9.5 billion—which McNamara believes would really cost another \$15 billion.

Once the public and political leaders saw which cities were on and off the extra-protection list, McNamara says, they would insist on a longer list. McNamara estimates that the ultimate cost of city protection would be \$40 billion spent over 10 years.

## As McNamara Sees Problem

In his recent "military posture" statement to Congressional committees, McNamara put the problem this way:

"Even before the systems become operational, pressures would mount for their expansion at a cost of still additional

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billions. The unprotected, or relatively unprotected, areas of the U.S. would claim that their tax dollars were being diverted to protect New York and Washington while they were left naked.

"And, critics would point out that our strategic offensive force is premised on a much larger Soviet threat (the 'possible', not the 'probable' threat); they would conclude that the same principles should be applied to our strategic defense forces.

"For these and other reasons, I believe that, once started, an ABM (anti-ballistic missile) system deployed with the objective of protecting the United States against the Soviet Union would require an expenditure on the order of \$40 billion over a 10-year period."

### Selection Is Troublesome

Any system of selecting cities for special war time protection would be troublesome. Some people must be left off any list.

The least troublesome method of selection might be to take them strictly in order of population. Most of the first and second sets of 25 cities selected by the chiefs are in the first and second groups of 25 cities listed by population in the 1960 census.

But some are not.

For instance Dallas is 14th in population but it does not appear on the chief's first list. San Diego is 18th in population, but it would have to await the second round to get its Sprint missiles, while smaller cities, like Seattle (19th in population), Portland, Ore. (32nd) and Honolulu (43rd) would be protected by the first installations.

Charleston, S. C., is not in the first 50 in population, but it is on the chief's list of the first 25 cities to get Sprint protection, presumably because of the Polaris submarine base there.

But Omaha, 42nd in population and the home of the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command, gets no protection.

Some other large cities left off both lists are Syracuse, N. Y.; Salt Lake City, Birmingham, Ala.; Charlotte, N. C.; and Rochester, N. Y.

McNamara made it clear in his posture statement that he believes that the whole exercise is futile. He would not spend substantial money on efforts to limit damage and death from a Russian attack simply because, in his opinion, there can be no real protection.

### Same Level of Deaths

In a critique he obviously aimed at the joint chief's 50-city plan, McNamara said a Russian attack could kill 120 million

Americans even with the proposed city protection. This is the same level of deaths estimated for an all-out attack against completely unprotected cities.

McNamara said that the 25-city plan could save 80 million lives in an attack if the Russians did nothing special to build a better offense and thereby overtake the American defense.

In an American "first strike"—that is, if the United States used its long-range nuclear weapons against Russia in response to a Russian invasion of Europe—the 25-city program could save 90 million American lives.

### Toll Would Jump

The 50-city deployment could save an additional 10 million lives under both war circumstances.

But if Russia spent as much on an improved offense—more and trickier missiles—as the United States spent on either of the two city-protection programs, the American death toll could be raised to 120 million on a Russian first strike and 90 million on an American first strike, McNamara figures show.

Russian fatalities under these various circumstances would range from 70 million to 120 million, McNamara estimates.

McNamara wants to spend almost all future American nuclear-war money on improvements to the offense and rest the nation's security largely on an ability to avoid nuclear war by threatening a ruinous reprisal raid.